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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
When does the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
require a state where an action is commenced to apply the workmen's
compensation law of a sister state? This question has vexed the
courts for almost as long as those laws have been enacted.' Much
has been written about the problem,2 but the case of Carroll v. Lanzc, 3
decided by the Supreme Court last year, gives currency to the question
and prompts a reappraisal of the law in this area. This review will
take into consideration the relevant Supreme Court decisions in light
of the purpose of workmen's compensation legislation and the full
faith and credit clause.
Workmen's Compensation
As the industrial revolution progressed, and a great number of
workers became subjected to the hazards of factory employment, the
fellow servant rule,4 assumption of risk,5 and contributory negligence 0
arose as defenses in personal injury actions. These defenses, a late
development of the common law," limited the situations in which an
employee was able to recover damages from his employer for injuries
incurred while at work. Accordingly, disabled workers and their de-
pendents were thrust upon the charity of the community. At the
start of the twentieth century, this unsatisfactory situation led many
1 See, e.g., North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93
(1916); In re American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693
(1913).--
2 See Angell, Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Acts For Injury
Abroad, 31 HARv. L. REv. 619 (1918); Dwan, Workmen's Compensation And
The Conflict Of Laws-The Restatement And Other Recent Developments,
20 MINN. L. Rav. 19 (1935); Dwan, Workmen's Compensation And The Con-flict Of Laws, 11 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1927); Wellen, Workmen's Compensation,
Conflict Of Laws And The Constitution, 55 W. VA. L. REV. 233 (1953) ; Note,
The Workmen's Compensation Act and the Conflict of Laws, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REY. 518 (1933).
3349 U.S. 408 (1955).
4 This doctrine generally may be stated to be that an employer is not liable
to a worker for personal injuries inflicted as a result of the negligence of
another worker. See Farwell v. Boston and Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.)
49 (1842) ; Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
5 "The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master,
and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends
injury to himself ... ." Priestley v. Fowler, supra note 4 at 6, 150 Eng. Rep.
at 1032-33. Consequently, if he does risk his safety, he cannot complain. See
also Farwell v. Boston and Worcester R.R., supra note 4.
6 If the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the accident he cannot recover.
See Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
7 The cases in notes 4, 5 and 6 supra, have been considered to be the be-
ginning of the doctrines for which they are cited. See I LARSoN, WORICMEX'S
COMPENSATION § 4.30 (1952).
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states to form legislative commissions which were delegated with the
responsibility of devising a method whereby workers or their sur-
vivors would not be left destitute when earning power was lost or
diminished because of a work-connected injury. As a model for the
legislation which they desired, the commissions naturally turned
toward the comprehensive system of social insurance which had been
developed in Germany 8 and England 9 during the last half of the
nineteenth century.
Although similar in purpose, the American statutes which were
enacted differ from some foreign legislation in that they are not
socialistic; 10 that is, the states do not contribute to the fund out of
which workers are compensated. Also, unlike the requirements of
social insurance, American workers do not pay anything. Rather,
employers have the sole responsibility for compensating an injured
employee.' To ensure the fulfillment of this duty, employers are re-
quired to purchase insurance from either a state insurance fund 12 or
from a private company, 13 or to deposit a sufficient amount of security
with the state to provide for possible injuries.14
Moreover, contrary to early thinking, the American statutes have
no basis in tort law.' 5 It is not the purpose of these statutes to settle
a controversy between two parties.' Fault is irrelevant, whether in-
jury is the result of the carelessness of the employer, or that of the
worker.17 In no way are the statutes concerned with respective rights
8Id. at § 5.20; see PROSSER, ToRTs § 69, at 382 (2d ed. 1955).
9 See Riesenfeld, Forty Years Of American Workmen's Compensation,
35 MINN. L. REv. 525, 527 (1951).
10 See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COmPENsATiON § 3.10 (1952).
"1E.g., N.Y. WORKmEN'S Comp. LAW §§ 10, 31; CAL. LAB. CODE, ANN.
§ 3700 (Deering 1953) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-801 (1949) ; MASS. ANN. LAws
c. 152, § 25A (Supp. 1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.195 (Supp. 1953); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:15-71 (1940).
'
2 E.g., N.Y. WOaMEN'S COmP. LAW § 50; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-801(1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.195 (Supp. 1953); N.D. REV. CODE § 65-0404
(1943); WASH. REv. CODE § 51.16.010 (1951).
13 E.g., N.Y. WORKmEN'S COmP. LAW § 50; CAr. LAB. CODE ANN. § 3700
(Deering 1953) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-801 (1949) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 152,§ 25A (Supp. 1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.195 (Supp. 1953); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-78 (1940).
14 E.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S COmP. LAW § 50; CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 3701
(Deering 1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §2372 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 72-801 (1949) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 152, § 25A (Supp. 1955) ; MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 17.195 (Supp. 1953). Depending upon the state, either of the methods
indicated in the text are exclusive, or some combination of the three are avail-
able. Examples of exclusive statutes are: N.D. REv. CODE § 65-0404 (1943);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.452 (1953) ; WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1951) ; Wyo.
ComP. STAT. ANN. § 72-102 (1945). For states where some combination of
procedure is allowed, see N.Y. WORKmEN'S Comp. LAw § 50; CAL. LAB. CODE
ANN. § 3700 (Deering 1953) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-801 (1949).
Is See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.20 (1952).
16 Ibid.
17E.g., N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComP. LAW § 10; CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 3600
(Deering 1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§72-201, 72-202 (1949); MICH. STAT.
1956]
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and breaches of duty.1 8 Because it is applicable to employment which
cannot be classified as ultra-hazardous, workmen's compensation is not
analogous to strict liability tort. 9 The only question with which there
is concern is whether there was a work-connected injury.20
The theory which does underlie workmen's compensation is based
upon the simple social reality that if an employee's earning power has
been lost or diminished because of a work-connected injury, both he
and those dependent upon him for support are liable to become charges
upon the community.2 ' It is felt that a pragmatic system, whereby
destitution is alleviated without a worker losing his self respect, is
better than sanctioning an increased number of beggars or establishing
poor houses 2 2 Through insurance, the "blood of the worker" is
assimilated into the price of the product.28 Since the cost of the in-
surance varies in each field of endeavor according to the amount of
hazard involved, it is readily apparent that an employer who has to
pay a larger premium will commensurately increase the cost of his
product. Thus, it is not the community at large which bears the cost
of compensation, as is the case under socialistic systems, but rather,
only those who purchase a particular product.
In harmony with this theory is the amount of compensation which
is paid .and the machinery by which the law is administered. At the
outset, it should be emphasized that tort principles of damages are not
in accord with the social philosophy of compensation. 24  Therefore,
loss of consortium as well as pain and suffering are generally not con-
sidered. The only injuries for which compensation is awarded are
those which produce actual disability and thus, presumably, loss of
earning power. In computing an award according to the loss of earn-
ing power, the statutes usually provide a set amount of recovery for
ANN. §§ 17.141, 17.152 (1951); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§34:15-1, 34:15-2 (1940);
Tax. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (1941). It is to be noted that these rep-
resentative statfites also provide for exceptions to the proposition stated in the
tt.t- If, for example, a workman is injured because he was intoxicated or if
he wilfully injures himself, he will not be entitled to compensation.
Is See 1 LASON, Woexcmax's COMPENSATION § 2.10 (1952).
19 Of course, it is also applicable to ultra-hazardous employment. E.g., N.Y.
WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAW § 3; CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 3352 (Deering Supp.
1953), § 3357, (.Deering 1953) ; IDAHo CODE ANN. § 72-105a (Supp. 1955);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.142 (1951), § 17.142(1) (Supp. 1953).
20 See Riesenfeld, Forty Years Of American Workmen's Compensation,
35 MINN. L. REv. 525, 530 (1951). See also N.Y. WORKMEN'S COmP. LAW
§ 10; CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 3600 (Deering 1953) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-201
(1949); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17-141 (1951); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1
(1940); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (1941).
21 See 1 LARSON, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION § 2.20 (1952).
22 Ibid.
23 See PROSSEa, TORTS § 69, at 383 (2d ed. 1955) ; 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 3, at 3-5 (3d ed. 1941) ; Riesenfeld, supra note 20, at 529.
24 See 1 LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.40 (1952); 1 SCHNEIDER,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6 (3d ed. 1941)
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a particular injury based upon a percentage of the worker's salary.25
Arbitrary maximum and minimum benefits are set up, however, so
that the amount of an award is not unlirmited.20 In addition, death
benefits are provided for the survivors of an employee:-who is killed
while working.27 In return for these benefits, workmen are denied
the right to sue their employers in tort.28 However, a workman may
still sue a third person who is. responsible for his injury.29 - In such
an instance the employer and his insurer are entitled to the amount
which has been expended in satisfying the compensation award-granted
to the workman.30 Moreover, to further "the beneficent purposes of
the legislation," the statutes are generally enforced by -administrative
agencies 31 wherein the strict rules of evidence are not adhered to and
formality of procedure is kept to a minimum. It is obvious -that all
of the discussed provisions are designed to prevent the employee and
his dependents from becoming destitute while he is unemployed be-
cause of his disability.
Due to the misconception that workmen'% compensation was bot-
tomed on tort, early cases incorrectly applied the traditional theory
of lea loci delicti to conflict of laiws situatiois.3 2 After -wcrkmen's
compensation had been in force for a short time, hoivever, the §6cial
25 E.g., N.Y. WoaxLEN's CoIP. LAW § 15; CAl. LAB. Com ANN. §§ 4653,
4654, 4658 (Deering 1953); DEl. CODm ANN. tit. 19, § 2324 .(1953); ILL. STAT.
ANN. § 14323 (Jones Supp. 1949); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.159, 17.160 (1940);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12 (1940).26 E.g., N.Y. WoRaN.'s C~op. LAW § 15; Dsa. CODE ANN. tit 19, § 2324(1953); IL. STAT. ANN. § 14323 (Jones Supp. 1949); MicH. STAT. ANN.§§ 17.159, 17.160 (1940); MrN. STAT. ANN. § 176.101 (Supp. 1954); NJ.
STAT. ANN. §'34:15-12 (1940).27 E.g., N.Y. WoaxmN's Comp. LAW § 16; C.AL. LAB. CODE ANN. §§4701,
4702 (Deering 1953) ; DEL. CODs ANN. tit. 19, § 2330 (1953) ; Ir.. STAT. ANN.
§ 143.22 (Jones Supp. 1949); MrcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.155 (1940); N.J. STAT.
A:-IN. § 34:15-13 (1940).28 E.g., N.Y. WoRxmNm's Coup. LAW § 11 (except vhere employer has not
conformed to rules of workmen's compensation) ; CAr. LAB. CoDe ANN. §§ 3601,
3706 (Deering 1953) (except if any employer fails to secure the payment of
compensation); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1953) ; ILL. STAT. ANN. § 143.21(Jones 1936) (except if an illegally employed minor is involved); MzcH. STAT.
ANN. § 17.144 (1940); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.04 (1946) (except where
employer has not conformed to rules of workmen's compensation).29 E.g., N.Y. Woxmam's Comre. LAw §29; CAt. LAB. CODE ANN. § 3852(Deering 1953); DEr. CO6- ANN. tit. 19, § 2 363(a) (1953); IL. STAT. ANN.§ 143.44 (Jones 1936) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.189 (Supp. 1953).30 E.g., N.Y. WoRKmxa's COILP. LAW §29; CA. LAB. CODE ANN. §3856
(Deering 1953); ILL. STAT. ANN. § 143.44 (Jones 1936); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
17.189 (Supp. 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (Purdon 1952).31 E.g., N.Y. Woca~ra's ComP. LAW § 142; CAL. LAB. CoDE ANN. § 60
(Deering 1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §2121 (1953); Ir. STAT. ANN.
§ 143.34 (Jones 1936); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.174 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN.
art. 1, Rule 1-6 (Purdon 1952). Some states give jurisdiction over workmen's
compensation actions to the judiciary. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1311
(1950).
32 See, e.g., North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93
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basis of the legislation was appreciated; consequently, tort concepts
were rejected.3 3 Two contract theories were then developed which
demanded application of the statute of the state wherein the employ-
ment contract was made. In deciding which of these concepts to
employ, it was important to determine whether the particular statute
was elective or compulsory. If the act was elective, it was held that
it became part of the contract and might be enforced no matter where
the injury occurred.3 4 The artificiality of this concept is apparent.
The act could not be a part of the contract because, though nomi-
natively elective, there is actually no consent, but rather, compulsion
because of the penalties involved. Incorporation of the statute into
the contract is a fiction because the parties are subject to subsequent
changes in the act. Further, no part of the statute which they do not
wish to incorporate may be dispensed with. More realistic is the
theory which has been applied to contracts made in states where the
act is deemed to be compulsory; it is considered that the act is a statu-
tory regulation of a status which is within the control of the state.
In support of this concept, it has been said that, "workmen's compen-
sation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of implied
contract.... The liability is based, not upon any act or omission of
the employer, but upon the existence of the relati6nship which the
employee bears to the employment because of and in the course of
which he has been injured." 35 Other bases for employing the law of
a particular state have been asserted. For example, the principal situs
of the employee's employment 3 6 and the state of residence of the
employee 37 have been considered to be important. In addition, there
are states where some combination of criteria is required. 38 This
was the status of conflicts theory when, in 1932, the Supreme Court
entered the field by indicating that the full faith and credit clause was
applicable to workmen's compensation statutes.
The Supreme Court
In Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,3 9 an action for damages
was brought under the workmen's compensation laws of New Hamp-
(1916); In re American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693(1913).
33 See Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N.Y. 544, 111 N.E. 351 (1916) ; Indus-
trial Comm'n v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 480, 174 Pac. 589 (1918) ; Grinnell
v. Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447, 98 Ad. 103 (1916). See also Dunlap, The Conflict
of Laws and Workmen's Compensation, 23 CALIF. L. Rav. 381, 382-83 (1935).
34 Pettiti v. T. J. Pardy Constr. Co., 130 Atd. 70 (Conn. 1925); Hagenback
v. Leppert, 66 Ind. App. 261, 117 N.E. 531 (1917).
35 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923).
36 See Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N.W. 977 (1921).
37 See 2 LARSON, WORKMfEN'S COMPENSATION § 87.60 (1952).
38 See Dunlap, The Conflict of Laws and Workmen's Compensation, 23
CALIF. L. REv. 381, 384-85 (1935).
39286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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shire in a court of that state and later removed to a federal court on
the ground of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff's decedent, a resident
of Vermont, had entered into a contract of employment with the
defendant, which had its principal place of business in that state. The
decedent had been hired to perform services in both Vermont and
New Hampshire and was killed while working in the latter state.
Although the New Hampshire statute permitted an employee who was
injured to elect, after the injury, to proceed by either a workman's
compensation action or one at common law, the employer claimed that
the action was barred by the Vermont compensation statute which
purported to provide the exclusive remedy for injured workers.
One basis of the plaintiff's claim was that to permit the Vermont
act to be asserted as a defense would be to give it extraterritorial
effect, whereas it is a well settled principle that a state only has power
to legislate within its borders. Justice Brandeis, who delivered the
Court's opinion, felt that recognition of the statute as a defense to the
New Hampshire action would not be giving the Vermont act extra-
territorial effect, because the act created a "statutory relation between
the parties" which was subject to regulation by Vermont so long as
that relation exists. Thus, Vermont had legislative jurisdiction to
provide that its act was the exclusive remedy for injured workmen
who had been employed there. The Court also agreed with the de-
fendant that the full faith and credit clause prevented an employee
from asserting rights in New Hampshire which would be denied him
in the state of his residence. An injunction against the bringing of
the suit in New Hampshire could have issued from a Vermont court.
Since the purpose of the act was to provide not only a remedy for
employees, but also a "limited and determinate" liability for em-
ployers, disallowance of the defense would have imposed an unwar-
ranted liability upon employers. The Court was of the opinion that
if a state refused to recognize a particular cause of action, the plaintiff
would have an opportunity to prosecute his claim in another juris-
diction. When, however, a substantive defense is denied efficacy, the
defendant is subjected to "irremediable injury."
The plaintiff also claimed that full faith and credit did not require
the enforcement of a law which is obnoxious to a state's public policy.
Justice Brandeis agreed that full faith and credit does not mean com-
plete deference to the statute of a sister state and that there is room
for some play of "conflicting policies." He further agreed that relief
might be denied if the forum state failed to provide a particular court
with jurisdiction to hear this type of claim; or failed to provide an
appropriate procedure by which the claim could be presented to a
court; or if the claim was actually obnoxious to the public policy of
the forum state; or if the liability which might be imposed was penal
in nature. Here the Vermont act was not obnoxious to the policy of
New Hampshire; it was merely different.
In addition to this, the interest of New Hampshire was considered
to be only casual because: (1) Vermont was the state of the em-
NOTES1956 ]
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ployee's residence; (2) the employer's principal place of business was
located there; and (3) New Hampshire was entered only temporarily
upon orders received in Vermont.
After deciding that all rights should be determined according to
the law of Vermont, it was significantly concluded that: "We have
no occasion to consider whether if the .injured employee had been a
resident of New Hampshire, or had been continuously enployed there,
or had left dependents there, recovery might validly have been per-
mitted under New -.ampshi're law." 40
Justice Stone concnrreI in the result reached, by the majority
because N-w Hampshire could recognize and apply the law of Ver-
mont through comity; thus,. a fedei -1 co-,.rt sitting in New Hampshire
could recognize and. apply the Vermont law. He concluded that in
the absence of any indication that New, Hampshire. would not recog-
nize the Vermont law, the federal court ought to recognize it. This
reasoning, he felt, precluded the necessity of deciding the constitutional
question of whether the full faith and credit clause required New
Hampshire to recognize and apply Vermont law. -If, however, it were
necessary to decide the constitutional problem, he added:
The interest, which New Hampshire has, in exercising that control, derived
from the presence of employer and employe within its borders, pnd the com-
mission of the tortious act there, is at least as valid as that f Vermont,
derived from the fact that the status is that of its citizens, and originated
when they were in Vermont, before going to New Hampshire. I can find
nothing in the history of the full fith and credit clause, or the decisions under
it, which lends support, to- the -Aiew.that it compels any state to subordinate its
domestic policy, with -respect to persons and their acts within its borders, to
the laws of any other. On the contraryI think it should be interpreted as
leaving the courts of New Hampshire free, in the circumstances now presented,
either to apply or refuse to apply the law of Vermont, in accordance with their
own interpretation of New Hampshire policy and law.41
The following year, this case was clarified in Ohio P'. Chattanooga
Boiler & Tank Co.42 There the employee was a resident of Tennessee,
the contract of employment was made in that state and the employer's
principal place of business Was located there. A proceeding was in-
stituted in Ohio, where the injury was incurred. It was held that the
claim was not barred by the Tennessee compensation statute because,
as construed by the highest court of that state, it was not exclusive,
i.e., it did not preclude recovery under the laws of another state. It
was reasoned that the full faith and credit clause does not require the
forum state to give greater effect to a statute than does the state which
enacted it.
40 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1932).
41 Id. at 164.
42 289 U.S. 439 (1933).
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The next case to present the problem to the Supreme Court was
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n.43 There the plain-
tiff, a non-resident alien, contracted in California to work for the de-
fendant in Alaska. The defendant was to transport the plaintiff from
California and, after the work was completed, bring him back to Cali-
fornia where he was to be paid. There was a further provision that
the parties were to be bound by the Alaska Workmen's Compensation
Law. The employee, injured in Alaska, brought an action under the
compensation law of California when he returned to that state. The
California law was specifically applicable to injuries suffered outside
the state, if the employee was a resident at the time of the injury and
the contract of employment had been made in California.4 4  It also
provided that: "No contract, rule or regulation shall exempt the
employer from liability for the compensation fixed by this act." 45
Justice Stone, now writing for the majority, indicated that the
injured workman who was brought back to California would probably
be unable to return to Alaska and thus be remediless. As a con-
comitant result there was danger of his becoming a public charge. In
exercising its power California was not acting arbitrarily, but rather,
had a legitimate interest in preventing this. As in the Clapper case,
the main problem presented was whether the California Court failed
to accord the Alaska act full faith and credit by not permitting it to
be asserted as a defense to the award of the California commission.
In this connection, Justice Stone wrote that:
In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress has not
prescribed, where the policy of one state statute comes into conflict with that
of another, the necessity of some accommodation of the conflicting interests of
the two states is still more apparent. A rigid and literal enforcement of the
full faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would
lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each
state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.
Unless by force of that clause a greater effect is thus to be given to a state
statute abroad than the clause permits it to have at home, it is unavoidable
that this Court determine for itself the extent to which the statute of one state
may qualify or deny rights asserted under the statute of another.46
It was his further opinion that "the governmental interests of each
jurisdiction" should be appraised and that the "scale of decision" be
turned according to their respective weight.
The factual distinctions between this and the Clapper situation,
that here the employee was not a resident of the state where the work
43294 U.S. 532 (1935).
44 This law was held applicable to non-residents as well as residents because
of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
federal constitution. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184
Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920), writ of error dismissed; 255 U.S. 445 (1921).
45 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 538
(1935).46 Id. at 547.
1956] NOTES
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
commenced and that the work was to be performed wholly outside of
the state, were not thought to be material differences which lessened
the interest of California and increased that of Alaska, where the em-
ployee was never a resident and to which he would never return.
Further, unlike the New Hampshire courts in the Clapper case, the
Supreme Court of California had declared it to be contrary to the
public policy of the State of California to apply the Alaska statute and
not its own. In a manner similar to justice Brandeis in the Clapper
case, Justice Stone wrote that "it is unnecessary to consider what
effect should be given to the California statute if the parties were domi-
ciled in Alaska or were their relationship to California such as to give
it a lesser interest in protecting the employee by securing for him an
adequate and readily available remedy." 47
The Court was faced in 1939 with Pacific Employer's Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n.48 There, the plaintiff was a resident of
Massachusetts and regularly employed there. He was temporarily
sent to California to work in a branch factory belonging to his em-
ployer, and while there was injured and awarded compensation under
the California Workmen's Compensation Act. The law of both Cali-
fornia and Massachusetts purported to provide the exclusive remedy
for injured workmen. In disallowing the claim that the full faith and
credit clause required utilization of the Massachusetts statute Justice
Stone, again writing for the majority, said:
This Court must determine for itself how far the full faith and credit clause
compels the qualification or denial of rights asserted under the laws of one
state, that of the forum, by the statute of another state.... But there would
seem to be little room for the exercise of that function when the statute of
the, forum is the expression of domestic policy, in terms declared to be ex-
clusive in' its application to persons and events within the state. Although
Massachusetts has an interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massa-
chutsetts erhployees while temporarily abroad in the course of their employment,
and may adopt that policy for itself, that could hardly be thought to support
an application of the full faith and credit clquse which would override the con-
stitutional authority of another state to legislate for the bodily safety and eco-
nomic protection of employees injured within it. Few matters could be deemed
more appropriately the concern of the state in which the injury occurs or more
completely within its power.49
The Clapper case was distinguished because the statute of Ver-
mont had not been declared to be obnoxious fo the policy of New
Hampshire, whereas California had declared the Massachusetts law
obnoxious to its public policy. The Alaska Packers rule was felt to
be merely that full faith and credit did not necessarily preclude one
state from enforcing in its own courts its own statutes having no extra-
47 Id. at 543.
48 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
49 Pacific Employer's Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 308 U.S. 493,
502-03 (1939).
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territorial operation forbidden by the fourteenth amendment. Thus,
those two cases were not considered to be inconsistent with the instant
holding.
The subsequent case of Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.50 pre-
sented a situation where a District of Columbia resident was killed
while working in Virginia. He was employed by a District employer
and was subject to work assignments in the District of Columbia.
The Supreme Court held that there was jurisdiction to entertain the
widow's claim because "some substantial connection between the Dis-
trict and the particular employee-employer relationship" was present.51
It was explicitly pointed out that the District's interest did not depend
upon either where the workman was employed or where he was in-
jured. It was also indicated that the amount of work performed in
the District was irrelevant. This attitude was necessary to circum-
vent the fact that the employee was working in Virginia for three
years before he was fatally injured.
The latest pronouncement on this problem is Carroll v. Lanza 5 2
where the plaintiff and his employer were both residents of Missouri.
The contract of employment was entered into in that state. However,
the plaintiff was working in Arkansas when he was injured by his.
employer's employer, the prime contractor. The plaintiff received
payments for 34 weeks under the exclusive Missouri Workmen's
Compensation Act.53  As construed, that act did not consider prime
contractors to be third persons against whom a common-law action
could be brought. Plaintiff then brought a common-law action against
the defendant under the Arkansas law which permitted prime con-
tractors to be sued as third persons. The defendant, a Louisiana
contractor, defended on the ground that the full faith and credit clause
required the Missouri law to be applied. It was claimed that the ac-
tion was not maintainable in Missouri so it should not be permitted
in Arkansas.
At the outset of the opinion, the Court explained that the Clapper
case allowed a state to fix an exclusive remedy for :esidents and busi-
nesses located within the state and refused to permit other states to
fix an inconsistent remedy. The Pacific case was said to allow the
forum to apply its own remedy when the other state's statute was
"obnoxious" to the law of the forum. It was felt that the fact that
the instant case involved a common-law remedy of the forum rather
than the compensation remedy permitted in the Pacific case was im-
o 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
sl Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947).
52 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
53 That the plaintiff received payments under the Missouri act did not pre-
clude him from suing in Arkansas. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320
U.S. 430 (1943), was held not to be controlling, because the payments received
in Missouri were not "final." It is to be observed that this limits the Magnolia
case to a further extent than did Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622(1947).
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material. In deciding that Arkansas need not apply the law of Mis-
souri, the Court stated that, "her interests are large and considerable
and'are to be weighed not only in the light of the facts of this case but
by the kind of situation presented." 4, This concept was obviously
employed because the facts established that the plaintiff had not re-
mained within Arkansas after the injury, but was almost immediately
removed to Missouri. It is difficult to understand how Arkansas could
have an interest since the injury imposed no burden upon her. The
attitude of the Court was that, "if Arkansas could not apply her own
state laws, the state of injury would be powerless to safeguard non-
resident employees within its own borders. We do not think that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that subserviency from the
State of the injury." 15
There is a similarity between Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in the Carroll case and Justice Stone's concurring opinion in the
Clapper case. It will be remembered that there it was felt there was
no indication that New Hampshire would refuse to give the Vermont
act effect through comity, so the federal court in New Hampshire
should extend that comity. Here, Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed
that although Missouri prohibited suits against prime contractors who
were residents of Missouri, there was no indication that the same law
would apply if the prime contractor were a nonresident. He there-
fore was of the opinion that the Court should remand the case in order
to determine the true state of Missouri law on this point. It was,
in his opinion, unnecessary to decide that Arkansas need not give full
faith and credit to the Missouri law. If the Missouri law were the
same as the Arkansas law, there would be no problem in choice of law
and the full faith and credit problem would not arise.
However, since the majority decided the case upon constitutional
grounds, the dissent discussed that problem. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
felt that in the past the Court has adopted an interest weighing ap-
proach. The factors which have been considered relevant in prior
cases are: (1) place of the employment contract; (2) residence of
the parties; (3) place of injury; (4) possibility of the workman be-
coming a public charge in the state seeking to award compensation;
(5) interest of a state in securing prompt medical payments to resi-
dents; (6) exclusiveness of the foreign statute; (7) interest in bodily
safety and economic protection of workers within the state; (8) differ-
ence between a defense which if rejected results in irremediable lia-
bility, and a cause of action which if not allowed in one state can be
pursued in another; (9) amount of work to be performed in a state;
(10) policy of determinate liability and the necessity for a prompt
remedy which underlies workmen's compensation acts. The Clapper
case had held that the forum must permit a defense based upon the
54 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) (emphasis added).55 Id. at 414.
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exclusiveness of a sister state statute where the only contact of the
forum was the injury. In the Alaska case it was decided that the
place of the contract could award compensation although the injury
occurred elsewhere. In the Pacific case it was held that the forum
could prevail if- the only point of contact was an injury within the
state and the enforcement of the defense of the foreign statute was
"obnoxious" to the forum's policy. Here the only point of contact
with the forum was the injury, thus it duplicates the Clappr situa-
tion; Mr. Justice Frankfurter saw no reason for overruling that case.He also noted that in the Alaska and the:Pacil cases Justice
Stone buttressed the Court's opinion by observing that Congress had
not legislatively decreed that "Acts" need be given full faith and
credit.56  In light of this Mr. Justice Frankfurter felt that weight
must be given to the amendment, in 1948,-of Section 1738 of Title 28,
whereby Congress provided that- "Acts" did have to be given full
faith and credit.
Full Faith and Credit
In -determining whether the full faith and credit clause demands
the application of another state's statute, the delicate problem of the
independence of sovereign states and their relationship to each other
and to the Union must be considered.5 7 The impact of the constitu-
tional provision may be appreciated from its history.
Conflict of laws problems did not arise in the early English
courts because of the principle of venue which required trial by a jury
of the vicinage6 s At a later period, however, in suits oil judgments
sought to be enforced in England, it was held that the law of the
jurisdiction which rendered the judgment was applicable. 9 In
colonial America, though, the judgments of another colony, as well as
those of English and foreign courts, were considered to be merely
prima facie evidence of the claim.60 Because of this attitude toward
foreign judgments, each colony became a haven for judgment debtors
from other colonies. 61 Starting from about the middle of the seven-
teenth century, however, the colonial trend turned toward greater
recognition.62 The Continental Congress in drafting the Articles of
Confederation incorporated into that document a full faith and credit
56 See note 46 supra.
W See Jackson, Full Faith And Credit-The Lawyer's Clause Of The Con-
stitution, 45 COLUm. L. Rsv. 1, 11 (1945).
58 See 5 HoLDswoirT, A HismoRa OF ENGLISH LAW 117 (2d ed. 1937).
59 See Sumner, The Full-Faith-And-Credit Clause-Its History And Purpose,
34 Om. L Riv. 224, 226 (1955), citing Cottington's Case (1678) [cited in
Kennedy v. Cassillis, 2 Swans. 313, 326, 36 Eng. Rep. 635, 649 (1818)], and
Badtolph v. Bamfeild, Rep. t. Finch 186, 23 Eng. Rep. 102 (1674).60 See Sumner, supra note 59, at 226.
O Id. at 227.
62 Ibid.
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clause.6 This provision indicates an undoubted awareness on the
part of those responsible for the Articles that inequities resulted from
colonial provincialism in declining to recognize the judicial proceed-
ings of other colonies.64  It has been aptly observed, however, that
like the rest of the document, no provisions for enforcement were pro-
vided; thus an ineffective mandate was decreed. 65 In the four cases
which were decided after the adoption of the Articles and prior to the
Constitution, this provision was given varied weighty 6 Realizing that
national unity could not be achieved without the surrender of some
part of their independence by each state, the members of the Constitu-
tional Convention provided for legal unity in Article IV, Section 1.
As adopted, it provides that:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
In addition to providing for congressional enforcement, this section
was an advance over the similar provision in the Articles in that full
faith and credit was extended to "public Acts." It has been observed
by some researchers that surprisingly little attention was paid this
section in the state ratifying conventions.67  Indeed, The Federalist
merely makes an innocuous passing reference to it.68
63 "Full faith and credit shall be given, in each of these States, to the records,
acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other
State." Aim. oF CONFED. art. 4, § 3.
64 It is to be noted though, that the provision was given little considdration.
See Jackson, Full Faith And Credit-The Lawyer's Clause Of The Constitutiorn,
45 CoTiu. L. Rav. 1, 3 (1945).
65 See Sumner, The Full-Faith-And-Credit Clause-Its History And Purpose,
34 ORE. L. Ray. 224, 230 (1955).
66 See Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786). "... EB]ut full credence
ought to be given to judgements of the courts in any of the United States,
where both parties are within the jurisdiction of such courts at the time of
commencing the suit, and are duly served with the process... ." Id. at 126.
See also Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 261 (Pa. 1788). ". . . [T]he judgment ob-
tained in Massachusetts cannot be considered as conclusive evidence of the debt,
and therefore, the defendant ought still to be at liberty to controvert and deny
it. The articles of confederation must not be construed to work such evident
mischief and injustice, as are contained in the doctrine urged for the plaintiff."
Id. at 264. See also James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa. 1786). "The articles of
confederation . . . seem chiefly intended to oblige each state to receive the
records of another as full evidence of such acts and judicial proceedings."
Id. at 190. See also Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 Bay 8 (S.C. 1784). "We are bound
by the sentence of the court of admiralty in North-Carolina, until reversed by
some competent authority, and are obliged to give due faith and credit to all
its proceedings. The act of confederation is conclusive as to this point, and
the law of nations is equally strong upon it." Id. at 10.
67 See Sumner, supra note 65, at 235.
68 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 266 (Lodge ed. 1888) (Madison).
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In order to effectuate the constitutional provision, Congress, in
1790, enacted an enabling act which provided for the authentication of:
.. . the acts of the legislatures of the several states [and] . . . the records
and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state . . .. And the said records
and judicial proceedings . . . shall have such faith and credit given to them
in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the
courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken. 69
In 1804 a supplemental act was passed extending such recognition to
all non-judicial records of a state, and applying both the 1790 act and
that of 1804 to the territories of the United States.7 0 The only sig-
nificant change in this early legislation occurred in 1948 when Con-
gress substituted, in the beginning of the second sentence of the act
of 1790, "Such Acts," for "And the said." 7 A question which has
arisen since the change in this legislation is whether Congress intended
that henceforth public acts are required to have such credit given them
by courts as has been accorded judicial proceedings. 72
Conclusion
It is apparent that the national legal unity which the Framers
envisioned has not become established, at least in respect to workmen's
compensation. Of course, it would be folly to assert that the men at
the Constitutional Convention foresaw compensation statutes.7 3 How-
ever, it cannot be denied that they placed the means of state statutory'
unity in the hands of Congress.74 That Congress has not seen fit to
exercise those powers does not lend itself to a denial of their existence;
rather, an inference of the almost unsolvable nature -of the problem
should be drawn. It has been said that instead of legislating generally,
Congress has felt that the courts should indicate the answer "on a
case to case basis." 75
69 1 STAT. 122 (1790).
70 2 STAT. 298 (1804).
7162 STAT. 947 (1948). The legislation discussed in the text is now codified
in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738-39 (1952).
72 Compare Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 422 (1955) (dissenting opinion),
with Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 n.16 (1951).73 This proposition has been utilized as a "straw man" in order to give force
to the position that the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable to workmen's
compensation statutes. See Horovitz, Reviews of Leading Current Cases,
16 NACCA L.J. 38, 66 (1955).
74 See Corwin, The "Full Faith And Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 371,
388 (1933) ; Costigan, The History Of The Adoption Of Section I Of Article
IV Of The United States Constitution And A Consideration Of The Effect On
Judgments Of That Section And Of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUm. L. REv. 470,
474 (1904); Jackson, Full Faith And Credit-The Lawyer's Clause Of The
Constitution, 45 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 17 (1945).
75 See Reese, Full Faith And Credit To Statutes: The Defense Of Public
Policy, 19 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 339 (1952).
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From the standpoint of workmen's compensation it is apparent
that uniformity would advance the security which is the purpose of
that legislation. As the law now stands, a worker who is sent outside
the state of his residence and regular employment cannot be sure that
the protective statute which has been enacted by his representatives
will guard him and his dependents. Again, the employer who has
fully complied with the law under which he normally operates, does
not know whether that same law will prescribe the limits of his lia-
bility. Surely it cannot be said that this makes possible the foresee-
ability of liability for which the law strives.
From the discussed cases it is apparent that the Supreme Court
has not lived up to its responsibility to enforce the full faith and credit
clause. The status of conflicts of law with respect to workmen's
compensation statutes is now the same as it was prior to the Clapper
case. That the Court in Carroll v. Lanza gave lip service to an unreal
weight of interest concept is not reassuring in view of the facts of that
case. Besides, the weighing of interests can have no real practical
application. Whether a state has or has not an interest can be estab-
lished; however, the weight which should be ascribed each element
that goes toward making an interest is almost impossible of deter-
mination.7 6 It is believed that any such "test"- lends itself to abuses
that arise whenever the membership of the Supreme Court is changed.
A better solution would be one that adopts the unifying principles of
the full faith and credit clause to the recognized aims of workmen's
compensation legislation.
:. It has been said that the Carroll decision is sound on the ground
that employers should provide for the compensation of employees who
were injured without the state wherein they normally work. This is
not controverted. Objection is made to the accompanying suggestion
that this be accomplished by forcing employers to purchase compensa-
tion insurance in every state to which they send.workmen.n. This of
course will increase the financial burden of compensation when assured
relief for employees can be provided in another manner.
There can be no doubt as to the economic unity that this nation
has achieved because of the force of the interstate commerce clause.
An intl part of this ec'nomic unity is the securing of workmen
and.-theig-.families against destitution. It would seem that Congress
could demand that the statutes of one state be-recognized fully-in the
courts of every other.78 As a practical matter, -though, no end to
congressi6fial timidity in this respect can be foreseen. The Supreme
76 See Jackson, supra note 74, at 28.
77 See The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HAuv. L. RLv..%119, 133, 137-38
(1955).
7S See Cook, The Powers Of. Congress Under The Full Eqith And Credit
Clause, 28 YAm L.J. 421, 425, 433 (1919); Langmaid, The Full-Faiih And
Credit Required For Public Acts, 24 lxi.. L. REv.:383, 387(1920). See also
note 74 supra.
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Court could also compel recognition. By requiring full faith and credit
for another state's statute, the forum state would either have to con-
form its law or suffer the ignominy of being deprived of the sovereign
power of enforcing its law in its own courts. Although this restric-
tion would be imposed by the federal government, it should be empha-
sized that the powers deprived the states would not be federally
assumed. Rather, relinquishment of power by one state would be
compensated by its law being given effect in another. As a matter
of fact, the states have done more for statutory unity through the
adoption of uniform laws than has the federal government.
It is felt that the limitations on the state's sovereign power to
legislate exclusively within its territorial borders were known to the
people when the constitution was adopted by them. The uniformity
which was envisioned then should be perfected now.
